Attar Some Philosophical and Theological Passages from Fakhr al Din al Razi’s al Sirr al maktum By Muhammad Fariduddin Attar

 have transcribed some interesting passages in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s work on astral magic, al-Sirr al-maktūm (The Hidden Secret) based on MS Majlis 6853, compared with some other MSS. These passages are taken from the philosophical and theological portions of the work. I also outline the Sirr’s content and method of inquiry. The transcribed passages are part of the core material of a forthcoming article on the place of al-Sirr al-maktūm in Fakhr al-Dīn’s early philosophical thought.

“Sufism and the Anthropocosmic Self.” In I of the Heart: Texts and Studies in Honor of Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Islamic History and Civilization Series. Edited by M. Faruque, A. Khalil, and M. Rustom. Leiden: Brill, 2025, pp. 3–39.

It would not be an overstatement to say that the strand of thought now called Sufi metaphysics revolves around two interrelated doctrines, namely the oneness of being (waḥdat al-wujūd) and the perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil ). As is well-known, the expression waḥdat al-wujūd is controversial, which is composed of two words—waḥda and wujūd—both of which were important in the Islamic intellectual tradition since early days. The word “waḥda” means “unity or oneness,” and is of the same root as “tawḥīd,” which means “to affirm unity.” As for wujūd, which is from the root w-j-d, it is customary to translate it as Being, being or existence, but what is important to note is that in the Sufi context it is also understood as “to find” or “to experience.” For instance, Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) defines wujūd as “finding the Real in ecstasy” (wijdān al- ḥaqq fī l-wajd). Thus wujūd also has a mystical, first-person connotation, in addition to its regular ontological reference. In any event, waḥdat al-wujūd refers to the wujūd of the Real (al-ḥaqq), Who is self-evidently wāḥid (one), not to be denied by any Muslim. Hence there can only be one wujūd in reality. Understood thus, waḥdat al-wujūd implies that God or the Ultimate Reality is one, which is the essence of tawḥīd. But Sufi metaphysicians also discuss the complex nature of the muwaḥḥid (read “the perfect human”) or the affirmer of unity in the cosmic order. In doing so, they present a highly sophisticated analysis of the self, which is difficult to describe in simple terms. Building on the pioneering work of William Chittick, who uses the term “anthropocosmic vision” to describe the Islamic worldview, this study will explore the reality of the perfect human in terms of what it calls the “anthropocosmic self.” It will do so by principally drawing upon the School of Ibn ʿArabī and Sufi poets such as Rūmī (d. 672/1273) and Ḥāfiẓ (d. 791/1389).

God as Absolute Existence in Ibn ʿArabī: al-Taftāzānī’s Refutations of Akbarian Metaphysics [in Persian]

Throughout Islamic intellectual history, a wide range of conceptions of God have been articulated, among which the problematic view of Ibn ʿArabī-identifying God with Absolute Existence (al-wujūd al-muṭlaq)-stands out. Numerous critiques have been leveled against this identification, but the objections of Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī are particularly notable for their originality, clarity, and lasting influence on post-classical Islamic thought. In his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, al-Taftāzānī formulates several arguments against Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of God, focusing on the philosophical notion of Existence. Al-Taftāzānī regards Absolute Existence as a maʿqūl thānī (secondary intelligible), a universal concept in the mind with no extra-mental reality, which is instantiated only through its particular instances in the external world. He contends that this notion of Absolute Existence cannot be identical with God (or Necessary Existence), since God is an actual entity (ḥaqīqat fī al-khārij) and not merely a mental concept. This article critically examines al-Taftāzānī’s objections, arguing that his reading is misleading and that his refutation is grounded in a conception of Absolute Existence that differs significantly from that held by Ibn ʿArabī and his followers. Having contextualized al-Taftāzānī’s objections, I have sought to reconsider and rearticulate Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of God.

Introduction

Conceptions of God remain an understudied topic in the Persian-language academic literature on Islamic philosophy. Prevailing discussions typically focus on the existence of God, rather than on the more fundamental question of what, or who, the God is whose existence is being proven. In addition to the well-known conception of God as wholly distinct from the world, Islamic intellectual history presents alternative conceptions. Among these, the view advanced by Ibn ʿArabī has proven particularly problematic and controversial. This paper explores Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of God and critically engages with Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī’s well-known refutations. The analysis is based on a close study of the primary works of both Ibn ʿArabī and al-Taftāzānī, without recourse to later interpretations or receptions of their positions. Al- Taftāzānī’s critiques of Ibn ʿArabī have become classical, forming the metaphysical foundation for much of the subsequent criticism of Akbarian thought. Prominent followers of Ibn ʿArabī— including ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī, Ḥamzah Fanārī, ʿAlī b. Aḥmad Mahāʾimī, Muḥammad b. Rasūl Barzanjī, Ibrāhīm Kūrānī, and others—considered these refutations serious enough to warrant extensive responses. This article offers a detailed study of al-Taftāzānī’s objections to Akbarian metaphysics in Persian scholarship.

Intellectual Hijra: Thinking In and Out of the BurningHouse of the Western Academy

This essay, which is an amalgamation of two presentations given at roundtables held by the Constructive Muslim Thought Seminar at the American Academy of Religion in 2022 and 2023, attempts to describe “constructive Muslim thought” in contexts both classical and contemporary, but focuses on delineating the continuing colonial context of this academy in which we are attempting to conduct this work and the consequences thereof. I argue that contemporary constructive Muslim thought in the Euro- American Academy (and its outposts in other lands) has much to learn from the model of Black studies and argue for a model of intellectual hijra or fugitivity, in which we strive to make a home in but not of the “burning house” of our modern academy.

From one point of view, “constructive Muslim thought” is nothing new, it is as old as Islam itself, but what is new is the institutional, political, and epistemic contexts that make constructive Muslim thought emerge as such. It is this new context that has created the separation between the “constructive” and the “descriptive,” marked out the “Muslim” as other than the default, and defined the parameters of “thought.” In the Abbasid context or that of the Mali or Ottoman empires, “Constructive Muslim Thought,” in its various branches of falsafa (philosophy), adab (belles lettres), uṣūl al- fiqh (jurisprudence), history, kalām (theology), or taṣawwuf (Sufism) would simply be “thought,” or more accurately

Philosophy of Religion in Islam: A Reader of Classical Sources

Short Biographies of the Authors of the Selected Texts

Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (Rhazes or Rhasis) (d. 313/925) was an Islamic thinker who, emulating the example of the Hellenistic physician and philosopher Galen (d. c. 216 CE), became competent first in medicine and then in philosophy to the extent that he earned the title “the Galen of the Arabs.” Like Galen, he reflected his experience in the experimental field to his views on metaphysics and natural philosophy and was therefore accused of deism (heresy). In his work al-Ṭibb al-rūḥānī (Spiritual Medicine), in which he interpreted ethics as “the treatment of the soul,” he presented an ethical thought that focused on the treatment of vices. His thoughts on the fear of death and grief in this work contain the manifestations of his Epicurean understanding of pleasure, and in this respect, it represents a different approach to the issue of death among the schools of Islamic thought.

Abū Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 322/933–4) is one of the leading figures who systematized the theological views of the Ismāʿīlī branch of Shīʿism. He made great efforts to spread the Ismāʿīlī cause, especially through his activities in the region of Ray. In his work Aʿlām al-nubuwwa (Te Sings of Prophethood), he aimed to show the necessity of prophethood and the inadequacy of reason in obtaining the truth against the philosopher Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 313/925).

Al-Ālūsī (d. 1270/1854) is an exegete known for his exegesis Rūḥ al-maʿānī (Te Spirit of Meanings). Although Rūḥ al-maʿānī is often perceived as one of the important texts of allusive (ishārī) exegesis, al-Ālūsī’s main contribution to the science of interpretation of the Qurʾān with this exegesis is his powerful summarization of the commentary-super commentary (sharḥ-ḥāshiya) literature. The issues that we encounter in approximately 80 super commentaries on al-Kashshāf (The Revealer) and 400 super commentaries on Anwār al-tanzīl (The Lights of Revelation), the majority of which were written during the Ottoman period, were largely revised by al-Ālūsī on the axis of rhetoric and subjected to a critical evaluation in accordance with his critical approach (taḥqīq).

An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, Volume 5: From the School of Shiraz to the Twentieth Century edited by S. H. Nasr and M. Aminrazavi

The volume under consideration is presented as the final element of the monumental series An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, which started in 1999 with From Zoroaster to ʿUmar Khayyām (Vol. I, Oxford University Press; republished in 2007 by I. B. Tauris), and continued with Ismaili Thought in the Classical Age (Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, 2001; Suheyl Academy, 2005; I. B. Tauris and The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2008), Philosophical Theology in the Middle Ages and Beyond (Vol. 3, I. B. Tauris and The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2010), and From the School of Illumination to Philosophical Mysticism (Vol. 4, I. B. Tauris and The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2013). With the almost 600 pages of the present volume, a quarter of century of groundbreaking research and painstaking organizational efforts by the general editor, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and his co-editor, Mehdi Aminrazavi, has come happily to an end. In bringing to completion this volume – and, with it, the colossal enterprise which it concludes – the two main editors have been assisted by a vast and qualified group of scholars, mainly but not exclusively Iranian, whose name are recorded in the List of Contributors (pp. xvii-xx) and who have mostly penned the English translations of the chosen texts.

Reason and Revelation in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and the Ashʿarī Tradition

What is the relation of reason to revelation? How do rational truths relate to truths in scripture? Does the Quran assert theological truths (“God exists”) in the same manner as it prescribes legal commands (“wine is forbidden”)? How do the texts of the Quran and Sunna convey such truths? This article reconsiders the status of reason and revelation in the Ashʿarī-Sunnī tradition, the prevailing school of theology in the premodern Islamicate world.1 The analysis focuses on what I term the “Ashʿarī theory of evidence” (dalīl) and its underlying epistemology, which, I argue, provides the operative definitions of reason and revelation for an influen- tial line of thinkers, from Bāqillānī (d. 1013) to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210). Rāzī provides a systematic account of the Ashʿarī approach in two influential prin- ciples defining the relation of reason to revelation (labeled P1 and P2 below).2 Put concisely, Rāzī asserts that (P1) “scriptural texts do not impart certitude whatsoever”

Islam and the Contemporary World: Interview with Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr

In 2009, I had the honour to interview Professor Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who is a Professor of Islamic Studies at George Washington University, Washington, DC, as part of the ‘Muslim Heritage Interview Series’. During the interview, Nasr touched on various topics related to Islam and modernity, Sufism, spirituality, consumerism and the environment. Thirteen years had elapsed since that interview and, with so many changes having taken place across the world in this intervening period, I was keen to speak to him again on some of the core themes we discussed then and to see how things have evolved in those areas over the years. The interview with Nasr covers some rare gems and insights from his illustrious career along with the following themes -Islamic Environmentalism, Trust, Resaclarization of the Sacred Tradition, Inspirational Scholars, The Concept of al-insān al-kāmil, Impact of Covid-19, Extremist Narratives, Globalization, Saudi 2030 Vision, Iran, Social and Geo-Political Trends, Traditionalism and Modernity. I conducted the interview with Nasr at George Washington University in December 2022. I do hope that the readers find the interview both enlightening and beneficial.

Introduction: Forms and Functions of Islamic Philosophy – Nora Jacobsen Ben Hammed

his article presents an introduction to this special issue of Intellectual History of the Islamicate World. We suggest that this collection of papers broadens the scope of Islamic philosophy by bringing new insights into diverse forms and affective experiences of philosophy. Together, these papers suggest a way of doing Islamic philosophy that is both living and communal. This issue emerges from the community formed within the Islamic Philosophy in Conversation Working Group. As such, the introduction to the collection also serves as a reminder of the necessity of support specifically for women and nonbinary academics, scholars of color, and other minoritized scholars in our field.

Avicennian DDS: the divine essence, knowledge, and power – Davlat Dadikhuda

In the Islamic tradition, there’s a long standing controversy over the relationship between God’s attributes and His essence, giving rise to diverse theories with significant theological implications. In one respect, these views are broadly categorizable into three: A1, the doctrine of divine complexity (DDC), A2, the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS), and B, the doctrine of divine anonymity (DDA). The entry focuses on DDS, specifically explaining the Avicennian version, and defends it against some objections from some recent DDC proponents.