Tag Archive for: Islam

Interpreting IbnʿArabī – Arjun A Nair

Interpreting IbnʿArabī: Philosophy, Theology, and Exegesis in Later Islam offers a comprehensive and critical examination of one of Islam’s most enigmatic and influential thinkers. Through close engagement with major controversies surrounding Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas-from the doctrine of the Oneness of Being to his vision of sainthood and Qurʾānic interpretation-this volume traces the rich and contested legacy of his thought across the Islamic intellectual tradition. Addressing the most debated aspects of IbnʿArabī’s teachings, this book surveys the major contests around the fixed entities, Divine Power, human freedom, and the nature of the Perfect Man. It delves into accusations of pantheism and theological transgression, and explores the strategies employed by the Shaykh al-Akbar’s followers to clarify, defend, or reinterpret his views. It also explores Ibn ʿArabī’s provocative Qurʾānic hermeneutics, which includes perspectives on mercy, the problem of idolatry, and the fate of unbelievers, situating the Shaykh’s teachings within broader Sufi, philosophical, and theological currents. Finally, it reveals how IbnʿArabī challenged dominant rationalist frameworks and expanded the boundaries of Islamic knowledge by restoring to imagination a central epistemological role. This book is an essential resource for scholars of Islamic philosophy, theology, Sufism, Qurʾānic studies, and the intellectual history of the Muslim world, shedding new light on the interpretive debates that have shaped IbnʿArabī’s enduring legacy.

https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003648628

Narrativity in the Poetry of Ḥāfiẓ By Cyrus A Zargar

Using theories of narrative in lyric poetry, this article makes a case for an affective narrative quality that pervades the ghazals of Khwāja Muḥammad Shams al-Dīn “Ḥāfiẓ” of Shiraz (d. 792/1390). Such “hidden” narrative corresponds to the general sensation that a particular poem extends from an unknown and immeasurable story. Under consideration is a phenomenon or manner of mediating reality that exists entirely for the reader or listener, a sense of a powerful and vaguely remembered narrative, intimated through fragmented allusions, images, names, and places. This evoked narrative benefits from an interdependence of ambiguity and urgency, in other words, a lack of clarity as well as an emphasis on an epic or even sublime experience. It is perhaps this effect that is centrally responsible for the complementary disorientation and appeal Ḥāfiẓ’s poetry instills in its audience, particularly in an audience with inclinations to encountering supersensory phenomena in the sensory domain. The article considers Sufi interest in Ḥāfīẓ as it relates to his poems’ narrative qualities. Citation: Cyrus Ali Zargar. “Narrativity in the Poetry of Ḥāfiẓ,” A Luminous Intellect: Essays in Honor of Hamid Algar (Islamic History and Civilization, 225), edited by Amina Inloes and Alan Godlas. Leiden: Brill, 2025, pp. 180-208.

Recognizing Recognition: Ma’rifa in Sufi Thought (Oxford Journal of Islamic Studies, 2026) – By Mohammed Rustom

This article delves into the Arabic noun Marifa as employed in a range of Arabic and Persian Sufi texts. After unpacking the semantics of the –r–f root in the Quran and hadith literature and juxtaposing Marifa with ilm, the piece seeks to demonstrate how Sufi authors specifically conceived of Marifa as a type of recognition of oneself and of God. This recognition is activated by the practice of dhikr or the remembrance of God, which in the end leads the recognizer to self-forgetting, perplexity, and bewilderment.

Marifa is a concept of central importance in Islamic thought. It appears variously in different intellectual disciplines such as hadıth, legal theory, theology, philosophy, and Sufism. In the secondary literature marifa features most prominently in scholarship on Sufism. However, scholars have always been at odds when it comes to rendering the term into English. This is why it is variously translated as ‘knowledge’, ‘gnosis’, ‘esoteric knowledge’, ‘experiential knowledge’, ‘mystical knowledge’, ‘cognition’, and even ‘unknowing’. 1 The same applies to its related Author’s note: I wish to thank Atif Khalil for his encouragement and insightful remarks on this article. 1 See, respectively, Reza Shah-Kazemi, ‘The notion and significance of Marifa in Sufism’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 13/2 (2002): 155–81; Mohammed Rustom, ‘Forms of gnosis in Sulamı¯’s Sufi exegesis of the Fatih : a’, Islam and Christian– Muslim Relations, 16/4 (2005): 327–44; Leonard Lewisohn (ed. and transl.), Esoteric Traditions in Islamic Thought: An Anthology of Texts on Esoteric

The Tranquility of Remembrance (From Razi to Ibn al-Qayyim) in I of the Heart (Leiden: Brill, 2025), 183-198. Edited by Muhammad U. Faruque, Atif Khalil, Mohammed Rustom

At its heart, prayer is the soul’s effort to communicate with and build a relationship with its Divine origin. Viewed this way, Islam recognizes three primary modes of prayer.

The first is the canonical, ritual prayer known as ṣalāt. This is the familiar practice involving specific movements, postures, and recited verses performed by devout Muslims at prescribed times each day. When performed in congregation, it stands as one of the most visible and universal symbols of Islamic faith.

The second mode is supplicatory prayer, or duʿāʾ—the personal act of petitioning God. In duʿāʾ, a believer may ask for help, guidance, or blessing, whether for matters of this world or the hereafter. While permissible, spiritual authorities caution against focusing these requests solely on transient, self-centered desires. The poet Rūmī illustrated this by comparing worldly desires to eating in a dream: the sensation feels real, but upon waking, it provides no true nourishment. To spend one’s prayers on such fleeting ends is to seek a reward as temporary as life itself.

Yet, even a duʿāʾ for a worldly need holds spiritual value. It reinforces the soul’s fundamental recognition of its own need and dependence, affirming God as the ultimate source of all goodness and blessing.

Inscriptions of Wisdom: The Sufism of Ibn al-ʿArabī in the Mirror of Jāmī By Mukhtar H Ali

Inscriptions of Wisdom brings together, for the first time in English, two pivotal Sufi texts that illuminate Ibn al-ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) celebrated work Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam. The first, Naqsh al-Fuṣūṣ (The Inscription of the Fuṣūṣ), is Ibn al-ʿArabī’s own distillation of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, presenting a concise yet profound articulation of its core teachings. The second, Naqd al-nuṣūṣ fī sharḥ Naqsh al-Fuṣūṣ (Selected Texts Commenting on Naqsh al-Fuṣūṣ), by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī, is an anthology of carefully selected passages from the earliest and most authoritative interpreters of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, enriched with Jāmī’s own insights. Together, these works explore the quintessential knowledge and divine principles embodied by each of the twenty-seven major prophetic figures of the Islamic tradition, from Adam to Muhammad. If Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam represents the culmination of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s thought, then Naqsh al-Fuṣūṣ distills its very essence and inner mystery. Mukhtar H. Ali’s meticulous presentation of the Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam commentarial tradition—featuring the first complete English translation of Jāmī’s Naqd al-nuṣūṣ, chapter-by-chapter analysis, and extensive notes on key Sufi terms and concepts—establishes this volume as a landmark study in Islamic metaphysics and Sufi thought.

Tirmidhi’s Kitāb al-‘Ilal – annotated translation By Jonathan Brown

Abū ʿĪsā Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī is one of the most influential figures in the Sunni hadith tradition. Born in about 210/825 near the city of Tirmidh on the northern bank of the Oxus River in modern-day Uzbekistan, he traveled widely in northeastern Iran, Iraq, and the Hejaz to study with the most sought-af ter scholars and transmitters of hadiths in his day. These included scholars who had themselves travelled widely in the quest to hear hadiths, such as Qutayba b. Saʿīd of Balkh (d. 240/854), as well as scholars who would become famed for their mastery of both hadith and law, such as al-Dārimī of Samarqand (d. 255/869) and Abū Dāwūd (author of the famous Sunan, d. 275/889). They also comprised the most respected masters of hadith criticism, including Muslim b. Ḥajjāj of Nishapur (author of the Ṣaḥīḥ, d. 260/875) and Abū Zurʿa al-Rāzī of Rayy (d. 264/878). But his most famous and influential teacher was none other than al-Bukhārī (author of the Ṣaḥīḥ, d. 256/870). At some point al-Tirmidhī returned to his hometown, where he died in 279/892 at around seventy years of age. Today his grave can be visited just north of Tirmidh in Uzbekistan, enclosed in an idyllic brick mausoleum built in the old Samanid style and frequented by local pilgrims. Al-Tirmidhī’s legal and theological leanings are clear in his works. Though he predated the solidification of the four schools of law, he identified with the general legal and theological tradition that he refers to as the ‘People of hadith’ (ahl al-ḥadīth). Notably, he also refers to this group as the ‘People of the Sunna and the Community’ (ahl alsunna wa’l-jamāʿa)-perhaps the earliest recorded instance of a scholar identifying himself with this designation. 1 Al-Tirmidhī describes this group as looking to exemplars like Mālik (d. 179/796), Sufyān b. ʿUyayna (d. 196/811), ʿAbdallāh b. al-Mubārak (d. 181/797), and Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh (d. 238/853). But the most influential figure in al-Tirmidhī’s theological universe was al-Bukhārī’s teacher and the pivot of the Ahl al-Sunna in Baghdad, Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Al-Tirmidhī’s legal views

The Prophet’s Day in China: A Study of the Inculturation of Islam in China, Based on Fieldwork in Xi’an, Najiaying, and Hezhou

Islam is widely spread throughout every corner of China, with the Hui people, the largest Muslim ethnic group in China, numbering over 10 million people, serving as its main carrier. Their culture types and local features exhibit great diversity across different provinces. The ceremony of Prophet’s Day or Mawlid al-Nabi in China, as one of the three fundamental festivals of the Hui people alongside Eid al-Fitur and Eid al-Qurban, appears to be more comprehensive, open, and localized. Drawing from fieldwork in three Hui communities—Xi’an in Shaanxi province, Najiaying in Yunnan province, and Hezhou in Gansu province—this paper approaches the topic from the perspective of inculturation and cultural innovation. It aims to describe the ritual processes observed in these three different Hui communities and discuss how the Hui people integrate Islam with traditional Chinese culture in their local contexts, with the intention of forming and preserving their own cultural characteristics.

Pleasures—Sensual and Spiritual: A Chapter from Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s Pilgrims’ Provision By Shafique N . Virani

This article offers a translation and analysis of Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s seminal discourse on pleasure from his philosophical treatise The Pilgrims’ Provision (Zād al-musāfirīn), illuminating the intricate interplay between sensual and intellectual delights in Islamic thought. It situates Nāṣir-i Khusraw within the broader intellectual tradition, highlighting his critique of Muḥammad b. Zakariyyāʾ al-Rāzī’s Epicurean-influenced conception of pleasure as mere relief from pain. Through rigorous refutation, Nāṣir-i Khusraw advances a framework wherein pleasure is a metaphysical phenomenon rooted in the soul’s ascent toward perfection and its reunion with the Universal Intellect. The chapter explores the gradations of pleasure across the natural, vegetative, sentient, and rational realms, culminating in the infinite joy of intellectual realization. Drawing on symbolic interpretation of the Quran, Nāṣir-i Khusraw redefines paradise not as a realm of corporeal indulgence, but as consummate knowledge, and hell as consummate ignorance. The translation is enriched by historical context, philosophical commentary, and poetic excerpts, offering readers a profound meditation on the nature of human fulfillment and the enduring relevance of spiritual pleasure in an age of material excess.

Desire, Determination and Action in Hayākil al-Nūr: Exploring the Legacy of Suhrawardī in Mughal India (1526-1857)

This paper examines the influence of Suhrawardī’s thought on Mughal intellectual landscape through a case study of the debate on human voluntary actions in Mīr Zāhid’s (d. 1689) super-commentary on Suhrawardī’s (d. 1191) Hayākil al-nūr. Central to this analysis is the relationship between cognitions, desires, and their role in the formation of will. I argue that for Suhrawardī, and subsequently Dawānī (d. 1502), volition is nothing more than an intense desire that dominates the soul. In contrast, Mīr Zāhid differentiates between desire and volition, positing that desire targets the goal of an action (e.g., being nourished), while volition pertains to the act itself (e.g., eating). By situating Mīr Zāhid’s argument within the broader context of engagement with Suhrawardī’s works in Mughal India, this paper contends that the study of the “Ishrāqī” legacy should not be articulated and pursued in terms of full adherence to Suhrawardī’s worldview. Instead, it should focus on how intellectuals in Mughal India responded to his arguments.

Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyá ibn Ḥabash ibn Amīrak al-Suhrawardī1 holds a prominent place in the history of Islamic philosophy, and his innovative ideas have left an indelible mark on various facets of philosophical discourse across the Islamicate world, a fact which is underscored by the survival of more than thirty commentaries on his works from Turkey, Iran, and India.2 Within the scope of the present study, which centers on Mughal India (1526–1857), the significance of Suhrawardī’s ideas for understanding the Mughal intellectual landscape

al-Haya: The Dignity of Shame By Oludamini Ogunnaike

By Oludamini Ogunnaike

It is perhaps not accidental that the Arabic word and central Islamic concept of ḥayāʾ (often translated as “shame,” “modesty,” or “shyness”) is very difficult to translate into modern English, given the profound differences in the world-senses animating the two discourses. Likewise, the modern English notion of “dignity,” although Islamic sources have played an indirect role in its development,7 does not have a single, exact equivalent in classical Islamic discourse, but ḥayāʾ covers much of the same ground. At first blush this appears to be a paradox, as dignity and shame are often described as oppo- sites: shame has been described as a violation of dignity, and a dignified person is not ashamed. However, even in English, this issue is more complicated, as illustrated by another seeming paradox: shameless people do the most shameful of deeds. Indeed, the early Sufi author al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072) wrote that “One of the signs of those who possess shame is that one will never see them in a shameful condition.” Thus, in the face of the brazen shameless- ness of recent political and business leaders and practices, numerous social campaigns—from the non-violent, coercive protest movements of Gandhi, mlk Jr., and the Civil Rights movement to the more recent environmental, social justice, and anti-war shame campaigns and boycotts targeting companies to the #MeToo movement—have attempted not only to deploy shame to change behaviors and conditions, but (especially in the cases of Gandhi and the civil rights movement) to reinstitute the principles of moral shame in domains dominated by shamelessness in order to restore or safeguard the dignity of both oppressed and oppressors.

“Sufism and the Anthropocosmic Self.” In I of the Heart: Texts and Studies in Honor of Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Islamic History and Civilization Series. Edited by M. Faruque, A. Khalil, and M. Rustom. Leiden: Brill, 2025, pp. 3–39.

It would not be an overstatement to say that the strand of thought now called Sufi metaphysics revolves around two interrelated doctrines, namely the oneness of being (waḥdat al-wujūd) and the perfect human (al-insān al-kāmil ). As is well-known, the expression waḥdat al-wujūd is controversial, which is composed of two words—waḥda and wujūd—both of which were important in the Islamic intellectual tradition since early days. The word “waḥda” means “unity or oneness,” and is of the same root as “tawḥīd,” which means “to affirm unity.” As for wujūd, which is from the root w-j-d, it is customary to translate it as Being, being or existence, but what is important to note is that in the Sufi context it is also understood as “to find” or “to experience.” For instance, Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240) defines wujūd as “finding the Real in ecstasy” (wijdān al- ḥaqq fī l-wajd). Thus wujūd also has a mystical, first-person connotation, in addition to its regular ontological reference. In any event, waḥdat al-wujūd refers to the wujūd of the Real (al-ḥaqq), Who is self-evidently wāḥid (one), not to be denied by any Muslim. Hence there can only be one wujūd in reality. Understood thus, waḥdat al-wujūd implies that God or the Ultimate Reality is one, which is the essence of tawḥīd. But Sufi metaphysicians also discuss the complex nature of the muwaḥḥid (read “the perfect human”) or the affirmer of unity in the cosmic order. In doing so, they present a highly sophisticated analysis of the self, which is difficult to describe in simple terms. Building on the pioneering work of William Chittick, who uses the term “anthropocosmic vision” to describe the Islamic worldview, this study will explore the reality of the perfect human in terms of what it calls the “anthropocosmic self.” It will do so by principally drawing upon the School of Ibn ʿArabī and Sufi poets such as Rūmī (d. 672/1273) and Ḥāfiẓ (d. 791/1389).

Devotion and Metaphysics in a Litany Ascribed to ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī

This article examines the status of Sufi devotional literature, a corpus still rarely considered in its own right within the study of Islamic thought. Focusing on the Ḥizb al-naṣr (Litany of Support) attributed to ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 1166) and still recited today within the Qādiriyya order, it argues that such devotional texts possess a distinctly doctrinal dimension, articulating metaphysical principles akin to those developed in the school of Ibn ʿArabī and his commentators. A close reading of the Ḥizb al-naṣr reveals a sophisticated theological and metaphysical background that contrasts sharply with the anti-intellectual image often associated with al-Jīlānī and his Ḥanbalī milieu. While the litany makes little explicit use of ontological terminology, its underlying vision resonates with Akbarian metaphysical themes and may reflect early intersections between Qādirī heritage and emerging doctrines of the Akbari tradition. By reconsidering the Ḥizb al-naṣr as an instance of “Sufi philosophy” in its own right, this study invites a broader reflection on the intellectual and doctrinal scope of Sufi devotional writing.